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I. INTRODUCrION
At the close of the business day on February 2, 1996, Japan's tenth largest
bank, the Osaka-based Daiwa Bank of Japan, ended its banking operations
in the United States, returned all federal and state banking licenses to the
appropriate banking regulatory authorities and announced the sale of its U.S.
operations to the world's second largest bank, the Sumitomo Bank of
Japan.' These actions came as a result of the November 2, 1995 revocation
of the bank's U.S. charter by the Federal Reserve Board and joint orders by

the Federal Reserve Board, the New York State Banking Department, and
the bank regulators of five other states, terminating the U.S. operations of the
Daiwa Bank and ordering the bank to cease all operations within 90 days.2
The November 2nd action by the Federal Reserve Board marked the first
time the Federal Reserve Board has exercised its power to expel a foreign
bank from the U.S. market.3

The unprecedented action by the U.S. banking regulatory authorities
follows an eleven-year cover-up by Toshihide Iguchi, a bond trader at the

* J.D. 1997. The author would like to thank Professor Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Director
of the Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law, for his advice and
suggestions. The author would also like to thank Nicolas Foster for his advice and patience
during the editing process.
1 Daiwa Bank Returns Its U.S. Banking Licenses; Completes Sale to Sumitomo, PR
Newswire, Feb. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
' Regulators Order Shut-down of U.S. Daiwa Units in 90 Days, BNA BANKING DAILY,
Nov. 3, 1995. The five state regulators which joined in issuing terminating orders are:
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Florida & Georgia. Id.
'John R. Wilke, Stern Rebuke: In a Signal to Japan, U.S. Bars Daiwa Bank and Indicts
Institution, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1995, at Al.
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New York branch, of over $1 billion in trading losses.4 While some experts
speculate that Iguchi could not have been acting alone due to the amount and
length of the cover-up, it is generally accepted that senior management did
not know of the losses until Iguchi sent a letter on July 17, 1995 to the bank
president admitting and explaining the losses.' On July 21, Iguchi followed
up his letter of admission with a letter of recommendations as to how to
continue the cover-up. Eleven days after learning of the losses, Daiwa
management decided that because of the current banking crisis in Japan, it
would be best for both Daiwa and the Japanese banking industry if the losses
were not disclosed until November.6 In pursuit of this plan, the New York
branch, on July 31, submitted a falsified balance sheet to the Federal
Reserve.7
While the Daiwa cover-up is troublesome in that both American and
Japanese regulatory authorities were unable to detect the problems,' the
aspect with the most serious implications for international banking is the
action taken by the Japanese Ministry of Finance. The Japanese regulatory
authority, the Ministry of Finance, was informed of the losses of the Daiwa
New York branch on August 8, 1995. 9 Rather than promptly informing the
Federal Reserve Board as is expected under international banking community

Delay seen in sentencing of Daiwa Bank's Iguchi, Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 11,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Iguchi has pled guilty to six charges
of fraud and forging documents. He faces a maximum penalty of 90 years imprisonment and
a $3 million fine.
Wilke, supra note 3.
6 On April 4, 1996, the former director of the New York branch pleaded guilty to a
charge of conspiring to defraud regulatory authorities and admitted that he had been
concerned that "disclosure would have resulted in Daiwa's stock going down and also likely
would have negatively affected the Japanese stock market and other Japanese banks." Patricia
Hurtado, Ex-Daiwa Bank Boss Admits Fraud,NEWSDAY, Apr. 5, 1996, at A41. See also The
Japanese Financial System: Hearing of the House Banking and Financial Institutions
Committee, Oct. 16, 1995.
7 Wilke, supra note 3.
Foreign Branches of Japanese Banks Will Face Tougher Audits, Agency Says, BNA
INTERNATIONAL BusNEss AND FINANCE DAILY, Nov. 2, 1995. The Ministry of Finance,
which had been criticized previously for failing to detect losses, is now implementing changes
in its supervisory practices. Japanese banks will now be required to report to the Ministry
more often on overseas operations. Additionally, the Ministry will require outside auditors
to conduct more frequent audits of overseas branches. The Ministry will penalize banks
whose reports differ from those of independent auditors.
' Wilke, supra note 3.
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standards,10 the Ministry of Finance did not inform the U.S. authorities of
the losses until September 18, forty-one days after the Ministry of Finance
learned of the losses."1 While some consider this to have been a serious
breach of trust on the part of the Japanese government, 2 U.S. officials have
stressed that they do not believe that there is a systematic risk with all
Japanese institutions 3 and that the delay was the result of different
perceptions of what was expected under international standards. 4
The delay in communication resulted from the Japanese regulatory practice
of involving an initial investigation to determine the validity of claims so as
to prevent unnecessary public panic and negative perceptions of the banking
industry.' 5 Ministry of Finance officials stressed that the Iguchi letter of
admission, which was given to the Ministry, was not enough to trigger the
obligation to report to the Federal Reserve Board until the claims were
substantiated. 6 The Ministry of Finance also stressed that the need for
urgent notification to the American authorities was lessened because U.S.
depositors were not in any danger and the only ones who would suffer

10

Kohei Murayama, U.S. upset over Japan's late reporting of Daiwa problem, Kyodo

News, Oct. 10, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Japanecon database.
1 Wilke, supra note 3. As a result of failing to notify American regulatory authorities
upon learning of the losses, Daiwa Bank Ltd. pleaded guilty to 16 felonies: 10 counts of
falsifying books and records, 2 counts of conspiracy, 2 counts of wire fraud, 1 count of a
cover-up and 1 count of obstructing an examination by the Federal Reserve Board. Peter
Truell, Daiwa Bank Admits Guilt in Cover-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996, at D1. The $340
million fine was the fourth-largest fine ever levied by the United States against a financial
institution. David E. Kalish, Daiwa Bank is Hit With $340M Fine, REC., Feb. 29, 1996, at
B1.
2 "If this episode is characteristic of the attitude of Japanese regulators towards
compliance with U.S. laws, I seriously question whether there can be any basis for trusting
and relying on the Finance Ministry or the Bank of Japan." Hearing on the Daiwa Bank of
Japan and Foreign Banks Operating in the U.S. Before the Senate Banking Committee, Nov.
27, 1995 [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato).
13 Murayama, supra note 10.
14 Handling of Daiwa Raises Questions About Japan's Supervisory Approach, BNA
INTERNATIONAL BusmNss AND FINANCE DAILY, Oct. 16, 1995. The banking environment
in Japan is quite different in terms of its regulatory framework. The system is based on
mutual trust between the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan and the commercial banks.
The Japanese banks are only given licenses after strict inspections at which point it is then
expected that the bank will perform on the basis of good faith and trustworthiness.
's Murayama, supra note 10.
16Id.
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monetary losses were the Japanese bank shareholders.' 7 The Daiwa incident
highlights the proposition that while a country can enact legislation to
address the special problems inherent in foreign bank supervision, the most
effective step towards adequate supervision would be the development of
international standards for bank supervision.
II. INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISION
Twenty years ago, banks chartered in a specific country would rarely
expand their operations into other countries. However, over the past two
decades, international banking practices have increased dramatically., 8
Despite the importance of international banking, the increased intertwining
of capital markets has increased the risk that problems abroad are more
likely to have serious effects on the domestic market.19 When one country
begins to experience difficulties in the banking sector, the integrity of the
worldwide financial system is weakened.
Despite the growth in international banking, there is no supranational
regulation of international banking.2" The reason for this is the banking
industry's ability to effectuate a government's monetary policies. Therefore,
the international banking community is regulated by the various national
supervisory authorities in accordance with the national law of the host-state.
Even though there is no supranational regulation, certain nations have
voluntarily agreed to adhere to a series of principles and guidelines

17 N.Y. regulatorurges Japan banks to remember Daiwa case,
Kyodo Newswire, Feb. 3,
1996, available in WESTLAW Japanecon. database. For fiscal year 1995, which ended
March 31, Daiwa suffered a net loss of 171.75 billion yen or 113.76 yen per share. ScandaltaintedDaiwa Bank Posts Big Losses in FY '95,Japan Economic Newswire, May 24, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. As a result of the scandal, Daiwa is
currently undergoing a dramatic restructuring plan involving a reduction of overseas
operations. Daiwa Bank unveils 2-year reconstructionplan, Japan Economic Newswire, Apr.
L.1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. See also, Daiwa Bank Set to
Withdrawfrom Malaysia, Jiji Press Ticker Service, July 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File; Scotiabank Announces Purchase of Daiwa Bank Canada, Aug. 14,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
IS Daniel B. Gail et al., The Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991:
Expanding the Umbrella of "Supervisory Reregulation", 26 INT'L LAW. 993, 994 (1992).
19Daniel M. Laifer, Putting the Super Back in the Supervision of InternationalBanking,
Post-BCCI, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 467, 467 (1992).
20 The General Agreement on Trade in Services deals with the competitive conditions
aspect of market access.
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established by the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory
Practices (Basel Committee). 2' These guidelines are centered around the
principle that the multinationalization of banking practices mandates the need
for standards in order to ensure the continued growth and stability of the
international banking community. Despite the fact that these principles are
not legally binding, they have been quite influential in shaping the supervisory practices of the member countries.
A. The General Agreement On Trade in Services
On April 15, 1994 in Marrakech, Morocco, the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations came to a conclusion and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) became the first legally enforceable
agreement covering trade in services.2 2 The General Agreement on Trade in
Services resulted from the recognition of the "growing importance of trade
in services for the growth and development of the world economy."23
Accordingly, the objective of GATS is to "establish a multilateral framework
of principles and rules for trade in services with a view to the expansion of
such trade under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization."'24 To facilitate this progressive liberalization, the GATS carries
forward the core General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principles
of most-favored nation status25 and national treatment.26 Additionally, as

2'

Laifer, supra note 19, at 469. The members of the Committee are Belgium, Canada,

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
" General Agreement on Trade in Services, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 33; 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. The GATS is one of
the annexes to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Accordingly, any
country signing the WTO Agreement is bound to accept the GATS.
See generally,Mary E. Footer, The InternationalRegulation of Trade in Services Following
Completion of the Uruguay Round, 29 INT'L LAw. 453, 454 (1995) (describing previous
attempts of the GATT Contracting Parties to address sectoral issues in the services field).
, GATS, supra note 22, at prmbl.
2 id.
25 Id. art 11:1. "With respect to any measure covered by this agreement, each Member
shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other
Member treatment no less favourable than it accords to like services and service suppliers
from any other country."

220

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 26:215

with the GATT, GATS provides a framework for addressing barriers to trade
in services, includes specific commitments by WTO members to restrict the
use of barriers and provides a forum for negotiations.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services was made specifically
applicable to the financial services sector by the inclusion of the Annex on
Financial Services which adapted the general provisions of GATS to the
financial sector.27 The Annex provides that Members may retain domestic
regulations for "prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors,
depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by
a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the
financial system."'
However, these regulations must meet the Article VI
requirement of being "administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial
manner." 29 Additionally, while GATS allows Members to maintain
qualification and licensing requirements, the requirements must be "based on
objective and transparent criteria"" and should "not [be] more burdensome
than necessary to ensure the quality of service."'"
While the GATS carries forward the core GATT principles of mostfavored nation status and national treatment, these principles as applied to
financial services were limited by the Second Annex on Financial Services
which allowed countries a temporary right to withdraw or modify the
commitments made during negotiations without offering compensation.3 2
Another departure from the most-favored-nation principle provided by the

2 Id. art XVII: I "... each Member shall accord to services and services suppliers of any
other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less
favourable than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers."
27 Id. Annex on Financial Services.
2 Id, Annex on Financial Services § 2(a).
29 Id. art VI:1.
30 Id. art IV:4(a).
"' Id. art IV:4(b).
32 Id. Second Annex on Financial Services.
This temporary right was granted so as to enable the parties to continue negotiations on
market liberalization because at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the United States was
unsatisfied with other countries' commitments. The United States was not willing to lock in
its own liberal policies without reciprocal guarantees of full market access on a most-favored
nation basis. Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in FinancialServices Under GATS, NAFTA and the
EC: A Regulatory JurisdictionAnalysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 54 (1995). The
U.S. maintained that if other countries did not liberalize their markets, the U.S. would seek
a MFN exemption for those countries. U.S. Expects Talks on Liberalizing Trade in Financial
Services to End on Schedule, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Dec. 13, 1994.
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Annex is that a "Member may recognize prudential measures of any other
country in determining how the Member's measures relating to financial
services shall be applied."33 The Member can recognize the prudential
measures of another country either as a basis of an agreement or of its own
accord.' However, the most-favored nation principle resurfaces because
Members to such an agreement are bound to allow others the opportunity
either to negotiate accession or to negotiate a comparable agreement.35
Furthermore, if the Member recognizes the prudential measures of the other
country of its own accord, the Member must allow other countries the
opportunity to demonstrate that comparable circumstances exist.' Overall,
the fact that financial services have been brought under the auspices of
GATS is likely to result in increased market access because of the commitment to "enter into successive rounds of negotiations ...with a view to
achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization. 3 7
B. Basel Committee Principlesfor InternationalBank Supervision
The Basel Committee, whose members consist of the supervisory
authorities of twelve nations, was organized in 1975 when the failure of the
German Herstatt Bank made it apparent that failures in the banking industry
abroad could have serious effects on domestic banking. 38 The Committee
was formed to provide a forum for "regular co-operation between its member
countries on banking supervisory matters. 39 The goal of the Committee
is to achieve harmonization of member nations' banking laws indirectly by
the issuance of principles and guidelines.
The trend towards the globalization of the banking community prompted
the Committee to set as its first goal the development of guidelines on the
respective roles of the home and host country supervisors in ensuring that the
entire banking operation was adequately supervised.' The result was the
issuance of the Basel Concordat of 1975 which set forth five basic principles.
33Id. Annex on Financial Services § 3(a).
3 Id.
35Id. Annex on Financial Services § 3(b).
3 Id.
37Id. art XIX: 1.
3 Duncan E. Alford, Basel Committee Minimum Standards: International Regulatory
Response to the Failureof BCCI, 26 GW J. INT'L L. & ECON. 241, 247 (1992).
39Id.
4 Id.
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These principles stressed that all foreign banks should be supervised and that
this responsibility should be shared by both the parent-country and hostcountry supervisory authorities. The Concordat recommended that the host
authority should take primary responsibility for the adequacy of the foreign
establishment's liquidity4' and that the parent authority should be primarily
responsible for the solvency of the foreign establishment.42 The fifth
principle of the Basel Concordat was that, because of the need for cooperation between supervisory authorities, legal restraints on the transfer of
information should be removed.4"
As the international banking community continued to grow, Committee
members realized that while the 1975 Concordat was an important step
forward in international bank supervision, there was a need to develop
specific supervisory standards for national regulatory authorities." The
result of this realization was the Revised Concordat of 1983 which built on
the primary objective of ensuring that no foreign banking establishment
would escape adequate supervision by introducing the approaches of
"consolidated supervision" and "dual key" supervision. 5
Consolidated supervision expanded the parent regulatory authority
responsibilities by advocating that the parent regulator monitor the parent
bank's total risk exposure and capital adequacy by reviewing the total
operations of the parent bank.'
Dual key supervision involves the
regulatory authorities of each nation concurrently assessing each other's
ability to supervise and carry out its responsibilities.4 7 The Revised
Concordat advocates that the host country either deny entry approval to an
institution from a country which does not adequately supervise its institutions
41 The rationale behind holding the host authorities primarily responsible for liquidity

supervision is that foreign establishments generally have to conform to local practices for
liquidity management and must comply with local liquidity regulations. Id. at 248.
42 Id. The rationale*behind holding the parent authorities primarily responsible for the
supervision of the solvency of overseas establishments is that the parent authorities are more
familiar with the entire operations of the bank.
43 See generally W. Peter Cooke, Supervising Multinational Banking Organizations:
Evolving Techniques for CooperationAmong Supervisory Authorities, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L.
& SEc. REG. 244, 246 (1981) (summarizing Basel Concordat).
4 Alford, supra note 38, at 250.
45
Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices, Revised Basel Concordat
on Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, reprinted in 22 I.L.M.
901 (1983) [hereinafter Revised Concordat].
46
1d. at 904.
7 Afford, supra note 38, at 252.
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or "impose specific conditions governing the conduct of the business of such
establishments. 48 Parent bank regulatory authorities are urged either to
discourage the parent bank from expanding operations into the proposed host
country or to attempt to expand their jurisdictional reach if it is believed that
the host country does not adequately supervise banking operations. 49 The
rationale behind the dual key approach was to prevent a "race to the bottom"
approach in banking regulation by which countries lowered supervisory
practices in order to attract foreign investment and foreign capital."
In 1990, the Basel Committee issued the Supplement to the Basel
Concordat on Ensuring of Adequate Information Flows between Banking
Supervisory Authorities (Supplement) which reiterated the need for adequate
cooperation and communication among regulatory authorities in order to
improve the quality of supervision of cross-border banking. 51 The Supplement stressed that because "[m]utual trust between supervisory authorities
can only be achieved if exchanges of information can flow with confidence
in both directions," 2 supervisory authorities should undertake an affirmative commitment to cooperate with each other on all prudential matters.53
While the Revised Concordat and the 1990 Supplement improved the
standards that were initially set forth in the Basel Concordat of 1975, there
were still important gaps in the allocation of supervisory responsibilities.
These gaps were exploited by the Bank of International Credit and
Commerce (BCCI). BCCI was able to evade supervision by setting up a
holding company in Luxembourg. This entity held two parent banks: BCCI
S.A., incorporated in Luxembourg, and BCCI Overseas, incorporated in the
Cayman Islands. Each of these banks had subsidiaries in foreign countries.
This structure gave BCCI the ability to evade consolidated supervision. Since
there were two parent banks, there were two countries responsible for the
overall safety of the institution and neither of the parent banks conducted its
primary operations in the country of incorporation. This problem was

48 Revised Concordat, supra note 45, at 903.
49Id.

Alford, supra note 38, at 253.
5' Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices: Supplement to the
Basel Concordat on the Ensuring of Adequate Information Flows between Banking
Supervisory Authorities (Apr. 1990) available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, BDIEL File
[hereinafter 1990 Supplement].
52 id.
5

53id.
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compounded by the fact that both Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands had
bank secrecy laws.'
The BCCI scandal led to the Basel Committee 1993 Report on Minimum
Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and Their
Cross-border Establishment. The Report continued to build on the principles
of consolidated supervision, dual key supervision, and communication
between supervisory authorities, while setting forth guidelines for the
implementation of these principles.5 5 In reiterating the need for consolidated
supervision, the Report recommends that the host country supervisors should
ensure that the parent country receives consolidated financial statements of
the global operations of the bank and that the parent authority has the means
to satisfy itself as to the completeness and validity of the statements.56
Additionally, the host country should assure itself that the parent country has
the authority to prevent banks in its jurisdiction from establishing organizational structures that circumvent supervision.
The second minimum standard that the Report advocates is that the host
country should determine whether the parent supervisory authorities have
consented to the establishment of the foreign branch. Additionally, the host
country should assess whether the organizational structure of the operation
is likely to cause confusion as to the appropriate allocation of supervisory
responsibilities.5 7 If the organizational structure has this potential, the host
country is advised to make sure that the other countries are aware of their
expected responsibilities and are willing to perform them.
The third minimum standard is that both the host country and parent
country should assure themselves of their right to gather information
concerning foreign operations. Finally, the Report recommends that if any
of the other minimum standards are not met, the host country should decide
that if no other restrictive practices are available to help assure itself of the

" Hal S. Scott, Supervision of InternationalBanking Post-BCCI, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
487, 493 (1992). Generally, bank secrecy laws protect the banker-client privilege by
imposing criminal sanctions for the release of information about a client's activities. C. Todd
Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States' Assault on Foreign Bank Secrecy, 12
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 454, 461 (1992).
s5Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum Standards for the Supervision of
International Banking Groups and Their Cross-Border Establishments (June 1992) available
in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, BDIEL File [hereinafter Minimum Standards].

56

Id.

' This type of situation is most likely to occur when the bank incorporates in a country
other than the one in which most of the operations are located.
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safety of the bank on a "stand-alone" basis, it should deny entry approval.
The Committee recommends that in judging whether the parent authority
meets the minimum standards, the host country should be the one to consider
whether the parent authority is trying to meet those standards. 8
III. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY STANDARDS
A. Supervisory Measures in the United States
In the United States, foreign banking establishments are regulated in
accordance with the Foreign Bank Supervision and Enhancement Act,59
which was enacted as Title II of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991.' While some critics of the U.S. regulation argue
that it serves to protect domestic banks from foreign competition,6' the
United States financial market has been open and foreign banks have become
increasingly important for the United States. 62 International banks in the
United States add approximately $20 million annually to the U.S. economy. 63
Foreign banks occupy over 48 million feet of office space and employ over
300,000 American workers. 64 Foreign banks hold approximately one-third
of all commercial and industrial loans and serve as an important source of
export financing.65 The importance of international banking to the U.S.
economy demonstrates that while it is necessary to ensure the stability of the
banking industry as a whole, it is also in the best interests of the U.S. market

58 Id.
'9 Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, secs. 201215, 105 Stat. 2286, 2286-305 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3101-3111) (1989) [hereinafter
FBSEA].
' L. Todd Gibson, Note, The Foreign Bank Supervision EnhancementAct of 1991: Short
Run ConsequencesEn Route to the Long Term Goal, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 119, 126
(1995).
61See generally, Raj Bhala, Tragedy, Irony, and ProtectionismAfter BCCI: A Three Act
Play Starring MaharajahBank, 48 SMU L. REV. 11 (1994).
62 Hearingon Closing of Japan'sDaiwa Bank U.S. OperationsBefore House Banking and
FinancialServices Committee, Dec. 5, 1995 [hereinafter Dec. 5 Hearings]. Currently, there
are 252 foreign banks operating in the United States.
63 Prepared statement by Lawrence R. Uhlick, Before House Banking and Financial
Services Subcommittee; Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Dec.
5, 1995, available in LEXIS.
4id.

' Dec. 5 Hearings, supra note 62.
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to remain open to foreign banks.
The United States was the first member of the Basel Committee to enact
legislation which codified the principles of the Report on Minimum
Standards.'
The Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act marked a
departure from the practice of having individual state authorities serve as the
primary regulators of foreign banks to a system in which the Federal Reserve
serves as the primary regulator, regardless of whether the foreign establishment receives a state or federal charter.67 While this position of the Federal
Reserve Board implements the proposed guidelines of the Revised Concordat
and Report on Minimum Standards, it could possibly violate the national
treatment principle of GATS. This is due to the dual supervisory structure
of the U.S. regulatory system which permits U.S. banks to receive a charter
from either a state regulator or the Federal Reserve Board.
Under the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act, the Federal
Reserve Board is given the sole authority to authorize the entry of a foreign
bank into the U.S. market." The threshold determination that the Federal
Reserve Board makes in deciding whether to grant entry approval involves
a two-step analysis. The Board first determines whether the "bank is subject
to comprehensive supervision or regulation on a consolidated basis by the
appropriate authorities in its home country." 69 Secondly, the Board
determines whether the "foreign bank has furnished to the Board the
information it needs to adequately assess the application."7
In assessing whether the foreign bank is subject to consolidated supervision, the Board evaluates the foreign country's banking laws and its ability
to carry those laws out by determining whether that regulator "receives
sufficient information on the worldwide operations of the foreign bank...
to assess its overall financial condition and compliance with law.'
In
deciding whether the foreign regulator receives this information, there are
four main factors the Federal Reserve Board takes into consideration. These
factors are whether the home-country regulator: (a) ensures that the parent
bank monitors global activities; (b) receives information on the condition of
branches outside of it's jurisdictional reach; (c) receives consolidated

6Gibson,
67

supra note 60, at 120.

Alford, supra note 38, at 243.

12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(1) (1989).
U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(A) (1989).
70 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(B) (1989).
7,12 C.F.R. s 211.24(c)(ii) (1993).
6912
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financial statements; and (d) evaluates prudential standards on a world-wide
72
basis.
In addition to the two mandatory standards that a foreign bank must meet
in order to be granted entry approval, there are four discretionary standards
that the Board can take into consideration. These discretionary standards are:
(a) whether the parent authorities have consented to the proposed establishment in the U.S.;73 (b) whether the bank is currently complying with U.S.
law;74 (c) whether the parent bank has adequately assured the Board as to its
intention to continue to provide information on global operations; 75 and (d)
whether management practices and history of the bank indicate that the bank
has the capacity to safely engage in international banking.76
Besides giving the Federal Reserve Board the sole authority to approve
entry into the United States, the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act
granted the Federal Reserve Board the power to expel a foreign bank from
operating in the U.S. market.77 The Board can terminate the operations of
a foreign bank if it is found that (1) the bank is-not subject to consolidated
supervision,78 or (2) reasonable cause exists to believe that the bank has
engaged in unsafe or illegal banking practices and that it is against the public
interest for the continued operation of the foreign bank.79
B. The United States Withdrawalfrom the GATS Financial Services
Agreement
Despite the openness of the U.S. financial market,80 on June 29, 1995, the
United States withdrew its offer of full market liberalization" and decided
to limit future access to institutions from countries which provide reciprocal

72 Id.

71 12
74 12
71 12
76

78

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
12 U.S.C.
12 U.S.C.
12 U.S.C.

§ 3105(d)(3)(A) (1989).
§ 3105(d)(3)(D) (1989).
§ 3105(d)(3)(C) (1989).
§ 3105(d)(3)(B) (1989).
§ 3105(e)(1) (1989).
§ 3105(e)(1)(A) (1989).

12 U.S.C. § 3105(e)(1)(B) (1989).
o See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
SI U.S. Withdraws Offer in WTO Talks; Shocked PartnersDub It a Bombshell, BNA INT'L
TRADE DAILY, June 20, 1995.
79
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rights.82 Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Jeffrey Schafer stated that the
withdrawal was occasioned by the failure of other countries to offer full
market access on a most-favored nation basis so that there "were import,
significant deficiencies across the sector." 3 The insufficiency of other
countries' offers was determined to pose a risk to U.S. financial institutions
which could be forced to withdraw from the foreign market without a U.S.
right to seek redress under the World Trade Organization system."
Additionally, the United States decided global market liberalization could be
more readily achieved in bilateral negotiations because full access to the U.S.
market would deprive the United States of negotiating leverage and cement
other countries' restrictions on entry.85
C. The WTO As a Forumfor Binding Standard Development
The United States' withdrawal from the financial services agreement is not
only a set-back for the globalization of the financial services sector, it is also
a potential set-back for the development of international standards for
banking supervision. The WTO provides a forum for the development of
binding supervisory standards. 6 The GATS provides that "[w]herever
82Bob Davis & John R. Wilke, Trade Official Is 'Close' to Limited Pact To Liberalize

Global Financial Services, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1995. Additionally, the United States
promised to maintain existing levels of access and national treatment for institutions already
operating in the U.S. market. Frances Williams, EU Eager to Salvage FinancialServices
Pact, FIN. TIMES, July 1, 1995, at Al.
Despite the withdrawal by the United States, on July 28, 1995, forty-three nations entered
into an agreement on the liberalization of financial services markets. Jose de la Torre, U.S.
Refusal to Join FinancialServices Pact is a Big Mistake, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995,
at Dl. The commitments made by the signatory countries are interim in nature and will
remain in effect until December 31, 1997 at which time the countries will renegotiate their
commitments. Trachtman, supra note 32, at 55.
83 Williams, supra note 82. Specifically, the refusal of East Asian developing nations to
ease stringent restrictions on entry prompted the U.S. withdrawal. Id. See U.S. Complains
at WTO of Few Offers to Open Up FinancialServices Markets, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY,
Mar. 29, 1995 (explaining that developing countries preferred a phased liberalization process
to that the development of their domestic banks would not be threatened by foreign
institutions).
" Williams, supra note 82.
85 Id.

86See Trachtman, supra note 32, at 53 (explaining while GATT was originally intended
to "complement the monetary policy work of the IMF," GATS has only begun to address the
regulatory and monetary concerns needed for the liberalization of trade in financial services).
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87
appropriate, recognition should be based on multilaterally agreed criteria.
Additionally, GATS mandates that in these situations the "Members shall
work ... towards the establishment and adoption of common international
standards and criteria for recognition ... ."88 As the recent Daiwa and
BCCI incidents emphasize, determining standards for banking supervision is
clearly an 'appropriate' situation for multilateral negotiation. The Daiwa
incident indicates that while mutual trust is essential to international banking
supervision, it is not enough because even an honest misunderstanding as to
expectations has the potential for negative consequences.8 9 In order to foster
and encourage the GATS liberalization process, there should be a definitive
set of legally binding rules and standards that countries can point to in order
to ascertain exactly what they can expect from others and what is expected
of them. If international standards are not developed, there is a risk not only
that the U.S. policy of welcoming foreign banks into the U.S. market will
become increasingly criticized by the American public,90 but also that,
because of the indisputable need for the liquidity that foreign banks provide,
industrialized nations will form increasingly stringent standards which only
other "club" members will be able to meet.
The WTO provides an appropriate forum for the development of these
standards because the negotiators are given the authority to enter into
multilateral binding agreements as opposed to a set of principles that the
parties are only "ethically" bound to implement. Another benefit of the
WTO is that it provides a multilateral forum, in which both developing
countries and industrial countries can participate. 9 While the industrialized
countries will undoubtedly have the most input into the supervisory
standards, Members are obliged to "facilitate the increasing participation of
developing countries. 92 Finally, developing countries will be given the
opportunity gradually to expand their operations without the correlative risk

" GATS, supra note 22, art. VII:5.
8 Id.
89 Hearings, supra note 12. Over the past decade Japan's share of the U.S. market
doubled so that it now exceeds $780 million because of the fact that the U.S. regulators
believed they could rely on Japanese authorities for trust and cooperation.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 62-65 and 84-85 (explaining that despite the U.S.
withdrawal from the financial services agreement, the U.S. market is open to foreign
institutions and that the U.S. is committed to global liberalization).
91 This is a marked difference from the Basel Committee which is comprised solely of
the banking supervisors from industrialized nations.
'2 GATS, supra note 22.
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of their own markets becoming controlled by foreign banks; this risk is
alleviated by the commitment Members made to take into account the
particular need of developing countries to exercise the right to introduce new
regulations to meet national policy objectives.93
IV. CONCLUSION

The Daiwa incident re-emphasizes the need for the development of
international supervisory standards. The increased intertwining of global
capital markets has resulted in heightened foreign investment and liquidity,
but it has also introduced the correlative risk that poor supervisory standards
in one nation can have potentially devastating effects abroad. International
regulatory standards would allow nations to continue to attract foreign
investment, avoid perceived "protectionist" legislation, and maintain the
stability of the banking industry. While the Basel Committee guidelines and
recommendations have greatly benefited the international banking community, the time has come for a legally binding set of concrete rules to which
various national supervisors can turn in supervising both domestic and
foreign banking establishments. These concrete rules are necessary because,
as the Daiwa incident demonstrates, even a good faith misunderstanding on
the part of one supervisor can have potentially global dramatic consequences.
The development of international standards is not only necessary in order
to help Member States continue their commitments to the progressive
liberalization of the financial sector, but it is also necessary to protect against
the risks that this progressive liberalization entails. Standards would allow
countries to draft their legislation so that it would conform to the GATS
transparency principle. The implementation of these standards would serve
to protect national legislation from allegations of protectionism.
The World Trade Organization provides the appropriate forum for the
negotiation of these standards because it is a multilateral forum in which
countries are represented by representatives who have the authority to bind
their respective governments. The use of the WTO would allow both the
industrialized and developing countries a neutral forum in which all members
would have an equal voice in the standard drafting. While the current
countries whose supervisors comprise the Basel Committee are likely to have
the most input into the drafting process, the Members are obliged to facilitate
the participation of developing countries. Another benefit of the WTO is
93

id.
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that it would allow Members the use of the dispute settlement system with
the possibility of compensation if Members do not comply with their
obligations. 94 The Member States should take the opportunity to use the
WTO to formulate international supervisory standards to complement their
GATS commitments without sacrificing the integrity of their financial
systems. These standards would prevent the possibility of a less efficient
protectionist market, a global decrease in liquidity and the further development of an exclusive "club" of supervisory authorities.

Id. art XXIII.

